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DE PAUL LAW REVIEW
TELEVISION AND CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
Investigation, one of the most important functions of Congress,' was re-
cently centered in the limelight of national attention when some of the
more sensational hearings of the Kefauver committee were presented to a
vast television audience.2 The refusal of some witnesses to testify because
of television3 has fostered much comment on the legality of compelling
testimony while the hearings are being televised.4
The power of Congress to conduct investigatory hearings and obtain
information from witnesses may not be questioned. This power originated
centuries ago in the English Parliament when that body performed certain
functions of a judicial nature, and it was exercised by the colonial legis-
latures prior to the formation of the union.5 The Constitution of the United
States authorized a Congress but made no mention of a power to investi-
gate. However, because existing legislatures had exercised this power for
many years previous to the promulgation of the Constitution, and because
the power is necessary to insure the proper exercise of granted power,
Congress is held to possess the power to investigate as inherent in a legis-
lative body.6 The inherent power of a legislature to punish contempt of its
sovereignty may be used to compel disclosures sought by legislative in-
quiries.7
1 "In my opinion, the power of investigation is one of the most important powers
of the Congress. The manner in which that power is exercised will largely deter-
mine the position and prestige of the Congress in the future. An informed Congress
is a wise ongress; an uninformed Congress surely will forfeit a large portion of the
respect and confidence of the people.
"The days when Webster, Clay and Calhoun personally could familiarize them-
selves with all the major matters with respect to which they were called upon to
legislate are gone forever. No Senator or Representative, no matter how able or
diligent, can himself hope to master all the facts necessary to legislate wisely." Excerpt
from the statement of President Truman on the floor of the United States Senate
when he, as Senator, announced his resignation from the Special Committee Investi-
gating the National Defense Program. go Cong. Rec. 6747 (Aug. 7, 1944)-
2 1 nvestigations, Crime Hunt in Foley Square, 57 Time, No. 13, at 2z (March ,6,
1951).
8 N.Y. Times, 5 1, p. i, col. 8 (March 27, 195i). See discussion note 5o infra.
4 Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, 187 Atlantic Monthly, No. 6, at 68 (June,
1951); Kefauver's Court: Trial by Camera, 173 Catholic World, No. 5, at 81 (May,
1951); The Kefauver T-V Show, S3 The Commonweal'6o6 (19S'); 27 New Yorker,
No. 7, at zo (March 31, 1951); 30 U.S. News and World Report, No. 14, at 16
(April 6, 195).
5 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 US. x68, 183 (88o); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US.
135, 161 (I927); Dimock, Congressional Investigating Committees, 46-56 (1929); Potts,
Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 691 (igz6);
Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investigation,
4o Harv. L. Ref. 153 (1926).
6 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (188o); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 US. 135
(1927).
7 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
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The first instance of the use of this power by Congress was in 1792, when
the causes for the failure of a military expedition were investigated.8 Con-
gress continued to exercise its investigatory powers and to punish recalci-
trant witnesses by contempt, but the courts were hesitant to extend this
power and its area of operation was sharply limited.9 In 1927, with the
case of McGrain v. Daugherty, ° which arose from the Tea Pot Dome in-
vestigations, the Supreme Court reversed the prevailing trend in holding
that Congress could lawfully inquire into any matter which was pertinent
to a lawful function of Congress. Subsequent cases have tended to enlarge
the legitimate area of inquiry and to give Congress a greater degree of
control over its investigations.1" A recent decision holds that the relevancy
and materiality of the inquiry will be presumed and that the remotest de-
gree of pertinency is sufficient to compel an answer.12
The privilege against self-incrimination 3 and the protection against un-
lawful searches and seizures' 4 have been held to constitute lawful reasons
for refusing to answer the inquiry of a congressional investigation", but
other attempted defenses have not been successful.'6
The reasons generally advanced to validate the presentation of congres-
sional hearings on television are that this medium of communication is
merely an extension of the long accepted public hearings and that the tele-
83 Annals Cong. 493 (1792).
9 "The net result of the decision [Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (188o) ],
therefore, was that for almost half a century serious doubt was cast on the very ex-
istence of a congressional power to compel testimony for the principal purpose of
obtaining information to assist Congres in drafting legislation." McGeary, Congres-
sional Investigations: Historical Development, t8 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 429 (1951);
Morgan, Congressional Investigations and judicial Review-Kilbourn v. Thompson
Revisited, 37 Calif. L. Rev. 556 (1949).
10273 U.S. 135 (1927).
11 Reed v. County Commissioners of Delaware County, Pennsylvania, 277 U.S. 376
(1928); Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929); Barry v. United States, 279 U.S.
597 (1929); Jurney v. MacCracken, 294 U.S. 125 (1935); United States v. Norris,
300 U.S. 564 (1937); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323 (1950).
12 United States v. Bryan, 72 F. Supp. 58 (D.C., 1947), aff'd sub nomine Barskv v.
United States 167 F. 2d 141 (App. D.C., 1948), cert. denied 334 U.S. 843 (1948).'
13 U.S. Const. Amend. 4.
14 U.S. Const. Amend. S.
15 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 478 (1894); Sinclair
v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 292 (1929).
16 Lawson v. United States, 176 F. 2d 49 (App. D.C., t949), cert. denied 339 U..
934 (95o), reh. denied 339 U.S. 972 (1950) (freedom of speech); Eisler v. United
States, 17o F. 2d 273 (App. D.C., 1948), cert. granted 33.5 U.S. 857 (1948), removed
from docket 338 U.S. 189 (949), cert. dismissed 338 U.S. 883 (1949) (alien status);
United States v. Josephson, 165 F. 2d 82 (App. D.C., 1947), cert. denied 333 US. 838(1948), rehearing denied 333 U.S. 858 (1949) (failure of Senate to provide standards
by which to determine the pertinency of questions, lack of prior opportunity to
determine the legality of the commttee in a judicial proceeding).
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vised hearings perform an important public service in informing the public
of the need for better laws or better law enforcement.17
Those who advance the argument that the televised hearings are merely
an extension of public hearings apparently overlook the purposes served
in requiring that hearings be public. The primary purpose of public hear-
ings is to protect the witness from a star chamber proceeding.' 8 While it
is important that a legislative hearing not be a star chamber, it is equally
important that it not be a circus.19 Therefore although television may be
only another form of publicity, differing merely in degree from the tra-
ditional modes of publicity, it in no manner furthers the reasons which
many years ago caused the death of star chamber proceedings. Even if it
be assumed that public congressional hearings are lawful and that no differ-
ence in principle exists between the normal public hearing and those which
are televised, the validity of the latter is not thereby established because
differences of degree are often decisive in the law.20 The substantial 2' and
unnecessary aggravation of the embarrassment suffered by a witness whose
testimony is televised could readily be held to be that degree of publicity
to which the reasonable man will not be forced to submit.22
A second argument advanced to support televised hearings is to inform
the public of the need for new legislation or for the improved enforce-
ment of existing law. No court has indicated that congressional investiga-
tions may be conducted merely for the purpose of instructing and edu-
cating the public. 28 The fundamental purpose of legislative investigations
17 Final report of the Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Inter-
state Commerce, Sen. Rep. 725, 82d Cong. ist Sess. 99-ioo (August 31, 1951).
18 A secondary purpose is to protect the public from any unlawful arrangements
which would result in the unjust exoneration of an accused person.
19 Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, 187 Atlantic Monthly, No. 6, at 68 (June,
1951).
20 Holmes, J., in Le Roy Fiber Co. v. Chicago Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., 232
U.S. 340, 354 (1914); Frankfurter, J., concurring, in Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459,
471 (1947).
21 See statement of Senator Welker during debate on the floor of the Senate on
the question whether two witnesses who refused to testify because of television should
be certified to the United States Attorney as being in contempt of the United States
Senate. 97 Cong. Rec. 9997 (August 1o, 1951).
22 The Fifth Amendment's provision that one shall not be deprived of liberty
without due process of law may be violated.
23 Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt, 74 U. of Pa. L. Rev.
780, 811 (1929). A recent commentator does not list it as a proper purpose but terms
it "an arm collateral" to other purposes. McGeary, Congressional Investigations:
Historical Development, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 425 (95). Compare the dictum in
Electric Bond & Share Co. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 303 U.S. 419,
437 (1938), where the plaintiff was required by regulation of the SEC to make
known some information to which the public would have access; and the statement
of President Wilson "The informing function of Congress should be preferred even
to its legislative function." Wilson, Congressional Government 303 (88s).
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is properly to inform the legislature in order to enable it to enact wise
future laws and to determine in what manner laws previously passed are
functioning.24 This purpose is best fulfilled by objective and impartial
information, but televised hearings are not in the least degree conducive
to securing this type of information.25 The very presence of the vast un-
seen audience naturally lessens the possible objectivity, because both the
committee members and the witnesses are unconsciously affected even
though the hearings be conducted with the utmost restraint and decorum. 26
Even assuming that it is lawful for Congress to conduct hearings to in-
form the public, it is very doubtful whether the benefits foreseen by many
actually do accrue. It was said by many commentators that the avid inter-
est of the public in the recent investigation into interstate crime fore-
shadowed a great public clamor for rigid enforcement of existing laws
and for the enactment of new laws where those in force were shown to be
inadequate. However the public seems to have turned off the television set
and fallen asleep in its easy chair after enjoying the hearings for what they
were-a good television show.2 7 The argument that televised hearings
should be permitted in order to inform and educate the public becomes
untenable when it is demonstrated that television actually subverts the
accomplishment of the fundamental purpose for which legislative investi-
gations were instituted, and that it is questionable whether the benefits
predicted to result from television actually do accrue.
Three major reasons may be advanced to support the proposition that
congressional investigations should not be televised: (i) televised hearings
violate our traditional concepts concerning proceedings of a criminal
nature; (2) televised hearings in practice destroy the usefulness of the
constitutional privilege against self-incrimination; and (3) televised hear-
ings violate the witness's right to privacy.
One concept of our traditional criminal procedure is that every man who
is publicly charged with seriohs crime before an authoritative tribunal shall
have first had a secret grand jury determination of his probable guilt in
order to protect him from rash and detracting accusations which have no
foundation in fact and which may be based on malice or mistake. Con-
24 McGeary, Congressional Investigations: Historical Development, 18 Univ. Chi.
L. Rev. 425 (1951).
25 "They [televised hearings] have served no conceivable legislative purpose or ob-
jective whatsoever." Statement by Senator Cain during Senate debate on the subject.
97 Cong. Rec. 9983 (August io, 195').
26 "They became the victims of a wave of emotion which they created, but over
which they had no control." Senator Cain during Senate debate on the subject.
97 Cong. Rec. 9978 (Aug. so, 195g1). "The requirements of the television stage . . .
make an objective investigation almost impossible." Arnold, Mob Justice and Tele-
vision, 187 Atlantic Monthly, No. 6, at 68 (June, 95).
27 The Kefauver T-V Show, 53 The Commonweal 6o6 (March 30, 1951); Kefauver's
Court: Trial by Camera, 173 The Catholic World, No. 5, at 8i (May, 1951).
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trast such a concept with the manner in which a televised legislative hear-
ing2 1 may be conducted.29 Some may protest that a legislative hearing
is not a criminal proceeding because no verdict is rendered and no punish-
ment is inflicted on the witness. It is true, of course, that these hearings
in fact do not amount to a criminal trial, but it is also true that the general
impression which is conveyed in many instances is that a criminal proceed-
ing is being conducted. ° The committee acts as prosecutor and judge and
the vast television audience acts as jury and renders a verdict. This verdict
many times inflicts a punishment-loss of the witness's reputation or of his
employment-which may be of more serious consequence to the individual
than the punishment of a court of law. 1
It has previously been stated that the privilege against self-incrimination
is one of the few rights to whose protection the courts have found the wit-
ncss in a congressional investigation to be entitled.32 Although the Courts
28 The damaging effect of televised hearings are accentuated in many instances be-
cause the witness lacks all but a few of the defensive weapons available to one who
is formally accused in a court of law. No court has found him to be entitled to the
presence of counsel, to the presumption of innocence, to the right of cross examination.
to submit his own prepared statement, to call even willing witnesses in his own
behalf, to require that an accurate record of his testimony be made, or to have only
admissible evidence used against him. Galloway, Congressional Investigations: Pro-
posed Reforms, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev. 478 (1951). If the witness before a televised
hearing were afforded these protections he would be more able to combat the charges
made against him and the audience-jury would be more able to correctly evaluate
the facts and secure truly objective information. When the witness is no longer
reiulired to repel gunfire with spears, a more compelling argument for televised
he::rings will be possible.
'-'!' It is nor to be suggested that all congressional hearings are conducted with no
nrtempt to protect the rights of the witness. An outstanding current example is the
Internal Security Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee which is con-
ducting an inquiry into a subject of a sensational nature-the extent of subversive
influcnces on various aspects of Governmental policy. "The Subcommittee forbids the
Isc of television, or direct radio reporting. It permits news pictures only at the be-
ginning and end of a session. Pictures may not be made of witnesses in the hearing
room against their will." 31 U.S. News and WVorld Report, No. 9, at 14 (August
it 1951). The Subcommittee counsel, who is treated in the same manner as a strange
lawyer, is instructed to keep his questions pertinent. The aim is to paint the picture
of subversive dangers through sworn testimony and not by artificial emphasis. This
admirable restraint is, as a general rule, sadl' lacking. It seems that legislators who
parade as "liberals" are no more aware of the rights of -witnesses than those who
have been branded "reactionaries."
30,"The President is most seriously concerned. The trouble with television hear-
ings, he said, is that a man is held before cameras and 4 0,000,000 people more or less
hear him charged with so and so, and the public, untrained generally with evaluatil
the presentation of evidence, is inclined to think him guilty just because he is charged.
"It is the very negation of judicial process, with the committee acting as prosecutor
and defense and the public acting as the jury." Excerpt from a White House press
release as quoted in the Chicago Daily News, p. 27, col. 5(June 22, 1951).
31 Galloway, Congressional Investigations: Proposed Reforms, 18 Univ. Chi. L. Rev.
478, 480 (951).
32 See text 113.
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have vigorously defended this privilege 3 its practical value may be de-
stroyed if hearings are televised because the man who would dare invoke
the privilege would immediately forfeit his good reputation in the eyes
of the vast audience viewing the hearing.3 4 The protection of this consti-
tutional privilege should not be so easily lost. This contention is many times
too easily dismissed by assuming that the witness is guilty because he other-
wise would not invoke the privilege against self-incrimination. However,
the Constitution does not distinguish between guilty and innocent, and the
admittedly guilty man remains entitled to his constitutional protections.
Therefore, the witness should be able to invoke the privilege without fear
of reprisal.3 5
Some have suggested that televised hearings violate a witness's right of
privacy.3 1 The development of the right of privacy as a basis for tort lia-
bility has been of relatively recent origin37 but the concept underlying this
right is evident in the provisions of our Bill of Rights.38 It has been charac-
terized as the right to be left alone39 and has been recognized as a consti-
tutionally protected right.40 The Supreme Court of the United States has
83 The constitutional guarantee against testimonial compulsion "must be accorded
liberal construction in favor of the right it was intended to secure." Hoffman v. United
States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951). Six of eight who have recently defended congressional
contempt citations on this basis have been exonerated. 57 Time, No. 14, at 18 (April a,
1951). For example see: United States v. Yukio Abe, 95 F. Supp. 991 (Hawaii, 1950);
United States v. Emspak, 9s F. Supp. ioiz (D.C., 1951); United States v. Fitzpatrick,
96 F. Supp. 491 (D.C., 1951); United States v. Raley, 96 F. Supp. 495 (D.C., 1951).
34 Arnold, Mob Justice and Television, x86 Atlantic Monthly, No. 6, at 68 (June,
1951).
35 "Embodied in the statutes or judicial decisions of all but six jurisdictions of the
United States is the rule that the defendant's failure to take the stand may neither give
rise to an inference against him nor be the subject of comment by court or counsel."
Comment on Defendant's Failure to Take The Stand, 57 Yale L.J. 145 (1947) and
sources cited therein.
36 Senator Cain in a speech on the floor of the United States Senate during debate
on the problem of television. 97 Cong. Rec. 9978 (Aug. 1o, 1951) and various other
commentators.
37 As a distinct right, privacy found its inception in Warren and Brandeis, The
Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (189o).
38 Note its presence in the freedoms guaranteed in the First Amendment, the right
to bear arms in the Second, the provision against peacetime quartering of soldiers in
private homes in the Third, the privilege against unreasonable searches and seizures
in the Fourth, the privilege against self incrimination and the requirement of due
process of law in the Fifth and the right to a speedy trial in the Sixth Amendment.
39 Barber v. Time, Inc. 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W. 2d z91 (94); Holloman v. Life Ins.
Co. of Virginia, 192 S.C. 454, 7 S.E. 2d 169 (194o); Banks v. King Features Syn-
dicate, 3o F. Supp. 352 (D.C., 1939); Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 299 S.W. 967
(1927).
40McGovern v. Van Riper, 137 N.J. Eq. 24, 45 A. 2d 514 (Ch., 1945), affirmed in
137 N.J. Eq. 548,45 A. ad 842 (Ch., 1946); cf. Norman v. Las Vegas, 64 Nev. 38, 177 P. 2d
442 (1947). See Pavesich v. New England Mutual Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 19o, 50 S.E. 68
(9o5); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. 91 (1931); Barber v. Time, Inc.,
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said that "the rights of privacy and personal security.. are to be regarded
as of the very essence of constitutional liberty; and that the guaranty of
them is as important and as imperative as are the guarantees of the other
fundamental rights of the individual citizen."41
The right of privacy does not allow a witness in a court of law to refuse
to answer a pertinent question merely because the question is of a private
nature. Although no case directly determines whether the same rule applies
to questions asked at congressional inquiries, both logic and the tenor of
the cases indicate that the rule would be thus extended.4 2 Conceding that,
because of the paramount public interest, congressional investigations may
lawfully invade the individual's right of privacy to the extent necessary
to enable Congress to secure the objective information necessary for legis-
lating wisely and intelligently, no sufficient justification appears for further
extending the privacy invasion by televising congressional hearings. The
questionable benefits43 said to accrue from the televised hearings do not
appear to be sufficient to permit the manifest injury inflicted on the privacy
of a witness who is compelled to testify on television. The witness who
iiay be forced to answer the most personal questions about his private
affairs if they are pertinent to the inquiry should not be forced to "confess
all" merely for the entertainment of the television audience or in order to
bestow financial benefits upon the program sponsor and the television
station.
Courts generally do not permit direct publication of their proceedings44
although one case held that it is not unlawful per se for a trial judge to
permit the proceedings of his court to be broadcast by radio.4 5 However,
the issue was not determined in the case in which the broadcast was made
348 Mo. 1199, 159 SW. .d 291 (1942); Voelker v. Tyndall, 226 Ind. 43, 75 N.E. 2d 548
(1947). Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Ohnstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928), termed the right of privacy "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
mlost valued by civilized men."
41 Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947), rehearing denied 331 U.S. 867 (1947).
42 \Vyzanski, Standards for Congressional Investigation, N.Y. Bar Rec. 99-1oo (1948).
4a See text 1'5.
44 "Proceedings in court should be conducted with fitting dignity and decorum.
The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of the court or recesses
between sessions, and the broadcasting of court proceedings are calculated to detract
from the essential dignity of the proceedings, degrade the court and create miscon-
ceptions with respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be permitted."
Canons of Judicial Ethics, American Bar Association, Canon 35 (1948).
"The taking of photographs in the court room during the progress of judicial pro-
ceedings or radio broadcasting of judicial proceedings from the courtroom shall not
be permitted by the court." Fed. Rules Crim. Proc. 53.
Consult Report of the Special Committee on Cooperation Between Press, Radio,
and Bar Association, 62 Annual Report of the American Association 851, 86z-864
( v937).45 Irwin v. Ashurst, 158 Ore. 61, 74 P. 2d 1127 (1938).
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but was raised later when the trial judge was sued in tort for an invasion
of privacy or libel resulting from the broadcast. The absolute privilege
afforded the official actions of a judicial officer seems to be the reason
underlying the decision. More in keeping with the traditional view is the
case citing the interest of witnesses and accused persons in minimizing the
publicity to which they are subjected as a reason to support the power of a
trial judge to forbid the taking of pictures in the courtroom and its immedi-
ate environs. 4" One of the reasons underlying the reluctance of courts to
permit widely publicized hearings seems to be the protection of the privacy
of the participants. If such a protection is afforded in a court of law where
all the traditional protections of the common law surround the witness,
it should be available at a congressional hearing where the witness retains
few of these protections. 47
Although the witnesses before the Kefauver Committee which investi-
gated interstate crime were predominately persons, who because they were
public personages or because of their connection with crime, had to some
degree waived their right to privacy, the usual legislative investigation gen-
erally involves neither the famous nor the notorious. The majority of wit-
nesses are average people who retain their right to privacy in its complete
form. Whether the right to privacy is violated is dependent upon the facts
in the individual case,"4 and while it may not have violated Ambassador
O'Dwyer's privacy to force him to testify on television, there are others
whose privacy television would invade. The reformed gangster in genuine
fear of death from former associates or enemies, the legitimate tavern
keeper testifying before a committee convinced that prohibition should
be reinstated, the expert with deformed features and the cloistered nun
who has a peculiar knowledge of a certain event all appear to have a legiti-
mate complaint against televised hearings although they may be willing to
impart what knowledge they possess at a normal hearing. The obvious
danger is that all witnesses will be treated in the same manner and that all
will indiscriminately be forced to testify on television.
When the Supreme Court considers this problem it is not unlikely that
Congress will be held to have no power to compel testimony at a televised
congressional hearing. The court may decide that all witnesses may be
compelled to testify at televised hearings, or that some witnesses in certain
instances may be forced to submit to television or a definite decision may
not be rendered in the near future.49 In any event it is imperative that Con-
4 6Ex parte Sturm, 15z Md. i14, 136 At. 312 (1927).
47 See discussion note 28 supra.
48Schuyler v. Curtis, 147 N.Y. 434, 42 N.E. 2d 22 (1895); State ex rel. Mavity v.
Tyndall, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E. 2d 755 (1946); Warren and Brandeis, The Right to
Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193, z 5 (189o).
49 There seems to be a general belief that the potential cases involving Mr. Morris
Kleinman and Mr. Louis Rothkopf will involve the lawfulness of compelling testi-
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gress adopt some code or policy which will protect the rights of witnesses
and demonstrate that "legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties
and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as the courts." 50
DISCRETIONARY ACTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES
UNDER THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
The enactment of the Federal Tort Claims Act' on August 2, 1946, swept
away in broad language the immunity of the Government to suits in tort.
The Act states that the government shall be liable in money damages only
for ".... injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death, caused by
the negligent or wrongful act, or omission of any employee of the govern-
ment while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under
circumstances where the United States, if a private person, would be liable
to the claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or
omission occurred."'2
The tort obligation of the United States became actual instead of moral.
Injured parties were given resort to the courts in lieu of the former method
of a petition to Congress which that legislature at its option and in its be-
nevolence could have responded to by the granting of relief in a private
bill.3
Government growth and spread into new fields had made federal con-
mony at a televised congressional hearing. On August to, 1951, the United States
Senate voted 38 to 13 to certify these men to the United States Attorney for the
District of Columbia as being in contempt of that body. 97 Cong. Rec. 100 13 (August
10, 1951). However a reading of the Senate debate which preceded the balloting indi-
cates that both Senators Kefauver and O'Conor were of the opinion that television
was involved in neither of these instances because the committee chairman, when
the witnesses refused to testify, offered to discontinue focusing the television cameras
on them. This position, however, seems subject to serious queston because the cameras
had been on the witnesses for about half an hour at the time of the offer and the
focusing of the cameras on some other participant in the hearings would continue
to permit the replies of the witnesses to be audible to the television audience.
50 Missouri, K. & T. Rv. Co. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1903). Many have ex-
pressed the opinion that Congress should be permitted to conduct its investigations
as it sees fit with little or no interference from the courts. For example see Frankfurter,
Hands Off The Investigations, 38 New Rep. 329 (1925); Jackson J. dissenting in
Eisler v. United States, 338 U.S. i89, 196 (1949).
1 6o Stat. 843 (946). New title: 6z Star. 992 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. SS 1346(b), 1402,
1504, 2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-268o (1948).
262 Stat. 933 (1948), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1346(b) (1948).
a The Special Senate Committee which reported on Title IV of the Legislative
Reorganization Bill of 1946 stated: "It [the Federal Tort Claims Act] is comple-
mentary to the provision in title I banning private bills and resolutions in Congress,
leaving claimants to their remedy under this title [the Act]." Sen. Rep. No. 1400(on S. 2177), 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1946).
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